We investigate the empirical relationship between decentralisation and corruption. Using a newly assembled dataset containing data for up to 174 countries, we revisit the empirical evidence and seek to explain some of the inconsistent results that exist in the literature. We find that not only results differ due to the use of different specifications and data but more importantly because previous research overlooks the relationship between different dimensions of decentralisation. We propose an approach aimed at exploring the aggregate effect of decentralization on corruption. In this context, we analyze the existence of direct and indirect effects of these aspects on corruption. Our results suggest that fiscal (market) decentralisation is associated with lower corruption. However, we also find that constitutional decentralisation (federalism) is associated with higher corruption. Furthermore, we find that certain forms of political decentralisation worsen the positive effect of constitutional centralization on corruption. Finally, other forms of decentralisation such as spatial decentralisation do not appear to have a strong association with corruption. Our results suggest the possibility that previous empirical work may grossly overestimate de aggregate impact of decentralization and corruption.
Introduction
In the past 30 years the number of federal states has increased. Among industrialized countries, Spain and Belgium have joined Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Similarly, Italy agreed to a federalist turn after a Constitutional reform in 2001. Developing countries are also becoming more federal: Brazil and Ethiopia have already embraced a federal arrangement, federalism is well under way in Uganda, Indonesia and Sri Lanka and the transition to a federal form of government has already been started in Iraq and Sudan. Although the motivations in each case respond to different factors, there are certain common elements behind this trend. One such element is the view that centralised governments encourage rent-seeking behaviour and therefore lead to higher levels of corruption 1 [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) ]. The theoretical literature on this topic would suggest however that such a simple view of the policy choice available is misplaced. The relationship between decentralisation and corruption is complex: decentralisation is multifaceted and can give rise to mixed predictions.
Under some conditions centralised governments are more corrupt whereas under some other definition of decentralisation they are more corrupt 2 .
Because of the reasons mentioned above, it is not surprising to observe a number of apparent inconsistencies in the empirical literature of decentralisation and corruption 3 . For instance, while some papers find evidence that federal countries have higher corruption ratings [Goldsmith (1999) , Treisman (2000) , and Wu (2005)], several other scholars have found that fiscal decentralisation is associated with lower corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002) , Barenstein and de Mello (2001) ]. In theory, federal states are not necessarily fiscally decentralised states, although it seems that there exists a positive association between these. According to Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) , the average sub-national share of expenditures is 38% for federal countries and 22% for unitary countries. However, there are examples of 1 Other important motivations for favouring a federal structure are the presence of strong ethnic minorities and national identities; the existence of considerable regional inequalities and the strengthening of local democratic institutions. For a more detailed insight of the causes of decentralisation see Rondinelli (2006) 2 For an excellent survey on the theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature see Fjelstad (2004) .
3 Methodological issues and conceptual problems are also important and contribute to generate inconsistencies and make comparison difficult. For an excellent discussion about these problems see ?
traditionally unitarist countries with a high degree of fiscal decentralisation. This is the case of the Scandinavian nations where sub-national expenditures represent over 30% of total government expenditures. The UK, embracing the devolved state model, is another example with sub-national expenditures averaging 23% during the 90's. At the other end, certain federal countries have a low degree of fiscal decentralisation: some notable examples are Croatia and Indonesia with only around 10% of their total government expenditures accounted for by sub-national governments.
Other studies focus on different aspects of decentralisation, such as political or administrative decentralisation. Based on long-standing political science theories, it has been argued that political decentralisation is important to improve accountability at the lower levels but the empirical evidence is inconclusive and often contradictory. Among those who find that accountability is improved with the existence of political decentralisation are Ames (1994) and Samuels (2000) . Other authors find no significant evidence of such relationship [Gelineau and Remmer (2006) ]. Additionally, some papers have found evidence that administrative decentralisation 4 within the public sector is associated with lower corruption [Wade (1997) , Kuncoro (2004) ].
In this paper we try to bring the empirics closer to the theory by acknowledging the several different dimensions of decentralisation and by taking a closer look at the empirical relationships among them. In so doing we build on a small recent literature that recognises this point. Treisman (2002b,a) provides a systematic treatment of the issue, carefully defining different types of decentralisation and providing measures for each of them. Recognising the importance of their joint effect on corruption he finds some direct effects but no interaction or indirect effects. Our study has a closer relationship with Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) however who test whether the effects of one of the aspects of decentralisation we also consider, fiscal decentralisation, on corruption depend on the existence and type of political institutions. In particular, they analyse how the level of political centralisation modifies the effect of fiscal decentralisation on corruption. They find evidence from this approach that strong party systems improve the result of fiscal decentralisation on corruption and that political centralisation along with market decentralisation improves government quality for a sample of developing countries. This evidence offers support for some long-standing political theories of decentralisation.
Our work raises the following issues:
• Based on theoretical explanations, which decentralisation measures are important?
• Are there multi-dimensional aspects?
• Are there any significant interaction effects?
• What is the aggregate effect of decentralisation on bureaucratic corruption?
We contribute to this recent literature both by recognising and measuring the existence of different dimensions of decentralisation but we also examine some hypotheses in order to provide a sensible econometric model. We collect a large set of decentralisation indicators -many of which have been used alternatively by earlier research-and group them into categories in order to re-examine the relevant empirical literature in a different light. Interestingly, we find evidence of heterogeneity in the relationship between decentralisation and corruption regardless of the decentralisation measure used. Furthermore, unlike earlier research we argue and find that some types of decentralisation are simultaneously associated with corruption through both direct and indirect effects. We do not explore the co-evolution of these dimensions of decentralisation 5 .
Our finding that long-standing unitary countries (constitutional centralisation) which are also fiscally decentralised have low corruption is to some extent present in earlier research. But unlike previous work, we find these two dimensions of decentralisation significantly associated with corruption simultaneously. This result is quite robust both in terms of a variety of specifications and controls used and in terms of alternative decentralisation measures. Furthermore, we also find 5 Unfortunately, we were not able to analyse time-varying features of the relationship between corruption and decentralisation. Although we have data on corruption and other control variables since 1975, there are almost no time-series data for decentralisation indicators. Apart from annual dummies of no use in panel-data methods, the only decentralisation measures with timeseries data are exp and rev. The problem with these is that the sample of countries suffers significant variations throughout the 25-year period.
evidence suggesting that political decentralisation -in particular, the existence of municipal elections-is also associated to corruption but only indirectly through its effect on constitutional decentralisation. In particular, political decentralisation worsens the impact of constitutional centralisation on corruption. This result is similar to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) who find a negative indirect effect of political institutions on corruption.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical background of decentralisation and federalism, define the different dimensions and explore the interrelations and overlaps between these dimensions. Section 3 details the data and the empirical strategy followed. Section 4 presents and discusses the main results. We also analyse different hypotheses regarding the joint impact of different dimensions of decentralisation on corruption. Section 5 concludes.
Decentralisation and theory
To motivate the empirical analysis we provide a review of the literature on decentralisation and corruption. Using a well-known approach 6 , we define four different types of decentralisation.
Market Decentralisation
7 . Usually associated with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism rooted in the public finance literature 8 , this form of decentralisation is concerned with the study of the conditions required for the existence of market mechanisms for the production and provision of goods and services. Based on ideas developed during the 50's, Oates (1972) shows first that in a multi-level government situation where at least some public goods have regionally-bounded benefits, decentralised finance provides opportunities for gains in social welfare.
Even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional externalities, decentralised provision creates a better outcome as opposed to a uniform centralised provision of public 6 The categorisation follows loosely the Type-Function Framework. This is the currently dominant approach to define and divide the different forms and types of decentralisation and is largely based on the work of Cheema, Nellis and Rondinelli. An overview of the Type-Function Framework given in ?
7 In this paper, we use the terms market decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation indistinctively 8 See Oates (2005) for references and summary of major contributions to this literature goods. Second, there is an informational asymmetry: local governments are better informed about the local preferences than the central government; this is also known as the preference-matching argument for fiscal decentralisation. Third, there is Tiebout's 'voting-with-the-feet' idea that citizens will sort themselves into homogeneous communities demanding the same local public goods [Tiebout (1956) ]. Finally, the existence and enforcement of hard-budget constraints should encourage local and regional governments to find ways to generate and rely on their own sources of revenue. On the contrary, if the local and regional governments customarily receive transfers from the centre or there are soft budget constraints, it is likely that efficiency levels will drop. Taking these arguments together, we would expect the scope for bureaucratic corruption to be lower in the presence of market decentralisation. In principle, intergovernmental competition to attract residents lowers the incentive and ability to extract rents and bribes. Moreover, the existence of hard-budget constraints reduces the scope for corruption since local governments are entirely responsible for financing their own expenditures.
In spite of the previous considerations, there remain theoretical arguments that suggest that forms of market decentralisation, such as fiscal decentralisation, may create perverse incentives and stimulate corrupt behaviour. For example, because of over-budgeting and lack of accountability in the case of soft-budget constraints arising from tax evasion and unconditional intergovernmental grants. This situation may be particularly relevant in cases where there is no political decentralisation. Another possible factor that may distort incentives is the way sub-national budgets are financed. Barenstein and de Mello (2001) have suggested that the relationship of fiscal decentralisation to corruption hinged on the way sub-national expenditures are financed.
Political Decentralisation. There is perhaps no better description of the difficulties in defining centralisation than Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that "Centralisation is now a word constantly repeated but is one that, generally speaking, no one tries to define accurately" 9 . Alongside Montesquieu and philosophers from the Enlightenment, de Tocqueville's ideas on federalism and decentralisation generated vigorous research effort to study the advantages and disadvantages of political decentralisation. The central idea of political decentralisation (or gov- [Aranson (1990) ]. In words of this author, "Federalism as constitutional decentralisation differs from federalism as contingent decentralisation in that the authority of the states under constitutional decentralisation is guaranteed as a matter of organic, constitutional law. Neither prudential nor political judgments or decisions taken at the national level can overturn such guarantees in the face of the appropriate legal fidelity to the original constitutional arrangement" [Aranson (1990), p. 20] . One connotation derived from this distinction is that constitutional decentralisation is a rather static concept while contingent decentralisation is inherently dynamic. In general, constitutional and contingent decentralisation will differ: contingent decentralisation is driven by pure utilitarist motives and this will shape the distribution of powers and federal arrangements in practice. Aranson (1990) shows the widening gap between these two concepts but in general it has happened in several other federal countries.
It may be even argued that contingent decentralisation will eventually cause a country to re-centralize if many judicial or consuetudinary instances erode the true nature and spirit of constitutional decentralisation. At the empirical level, however, distinguishing between these two types of 'federalism' is not practicable and only constitutional decentralisation measures can be used.
What are the predictions of the theory for the relationship between constitutional decentralisation and corruption? Similarly to the case of political decentralisation the answer is not clear. Constitutional federalism has often been advocated as a system to accommodate ethnic and religious differences and other regional divergences [Bermeo (2002) ]. Federalism provides room for diversity and reduces the possibility of tensions and conflicts which may also originate opportunities for the extraction of rents. Yet on the other hand, the well-known arguments of multiplication and overlapping of layers of government causing accountability problems and the 'overgrazing' of the bribe base in federal systems suggests that the latter may also be associated to higher corruption. 
where CORR i is the corruption index of choice, DEC i is our decentralisation indicator, logGDP i is the logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP), logP OP U L i is the logarithm of total population and P RESS i is the degree of press freedom 11 .
We test Model 1 using a dataset containing information for up to 177 countries.
This data include standard decentralisation indicators used by others and some newly assembled measures. To measure corruption we use the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index 12 . The decentralisation measures, definitions and coverage are given in Table 1 below. Some of the indicators are alternative measures for a certain type of decentralisation. More details about the data source and methodological procedure are given in the Data Appendix. Table 2 presents summary statistics for some of our variables. In line with our discussion in the previous section, we group these measures into four groups: market, constitutional, political and spatial decentralisation. In many 11 This is essentially a proxy for democratic conditions in a country. The inclusion of this variable here is supported by the empirical evidence confirming its robustness as a determinant of corruption [Brunetti and Weder (2003) , Chowdhury (2004) , and Freille et al. (ming) ] and the high correlation between press freedom and all the democracy indicators.
12 This choice is made to maximise the set of available observations. We have tested the robustness of this choice to the alternative measures of corruption by Transparency International's CPI and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and for a common set of countries find no substantive differences. These results are available from the authors on request.
cases we can capture different aspects of these four main types of decentralisation.
We detail the data sources for these variables in the Appendix, along with some summary statistics and the correlation between the variables.
Fiscal Decentralisation. The most commonly used indicator of fiscal decentralisation in the literature is the percentage ratio of sub-national government expenditure to total government expenditure. We also consider the sub-national government revenue since it is also a reasonable measure 13 . In both cases the data are an average for the 1990-2000 period.
Constitutional Decentralisation. Constitutional decentralisation refers to whether the structure of the relations between different government units are based on federal or unitary grounds according to legal bodies. In general, researchers capture this as a zero-one dummy with all countries not explicitly federal being considered as unitarian. In our study we explore several alternatives to this. Our main control for the federal structure of a country -unitaryhis-, however, is a newly assembled indicator that measures not only the current status of federal or unitary but also takes into account history into consideration. In particular, this variable gives the score of unitary history for a country during a period of 100 years. In other words, if a country has always been a federation or federal (Argentina, Canada, Malaysia and Switzerland among others), then the score assigned is 0. Countries that have been mostly unitary throughout this time period (like Denmark, Japan, and Sweden), receive high scores, whereas countries that have changed either changed regime or have a relatively short unitary history are ranked in between (Austria, Spain and Thailand).
Political Decentralisation. According to the World Bank, political decentralisation is about providing the citizens of a country more power in public decisionmaking and is associated with institutions ranging from pluralistic politics and representative government, to local and regional democratization and greater participation in decisions. We have a number of political decentralisation indicators taken from different sources. We consider three of these to most fully capture 13 One problem of using these two indicators as alternative is the existence of vertical fiscal imbalances. In short, this implies that sub-national revenues fall short of sub-national expenditure and the difference should be compensated by coordination mechanisms between the different levels of government. If the vertical imbalance is relatively high, it is better to use the expenditure indicator since it captures more adequately the degree of public service decentralisation. Table 3 . It appears from both that the interrelations between constitutional, political and structural decentralisation are straightforward. Of the correlations that are found some are intuitive; the positive correlation between federal and unitaryhis; that countries with a federal system are also likely to have local (muni) and regional (state) elections and have higher number of elected government tiers (tiers), for example. Other significant correlations are harder to explain as is the case with the correlation between unitaryhis and stconst. should have high corruption levels. Although the evidence is not as strong as Tables 4 and 5 contain the results for the baseline regression specified above. We have considered the robustness of the results to alternative measures of corruption (the CPI and ICRG indices of corruption) and to changes in the number of observations. We also reproduce the latter in Table 9 in the Appendix ?? where we use a common subset of countries including all the countries with data available for all three corruption indexes. In contrast to the results for market decentralisation less agreement has been found in the literature for constitutional decentralisation. Treisman (2000) found that federal states are perceived to be more corrupt and that this conclusion was robust to several tests, whereas for a different indicator Gerring et al. (2005) find that unitary systems are strongly associated to good governance. Other have found no relationship between federalism and corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002) ; Wu Also in Table 4 we explore whether using more detailed measures of constitutional Our federal dummy includes a slightly larger number of countries and therefore the number of federal states differ between our study and Treisman's. He uses the classification of federal countries as given in Elazar (1995) , while we use this and other sources to update the data. As a result of this, we add Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Ethiopia, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates to the list of federal countries.
16 Although the authors have used time series data we estimate the model using the index for the year 2000. We do this since there is little year-to-year variation in the index and we were unable to obtain the original data. The variable measures the unitary history of a country from 1901 to 2000. For construction, measurement and coverage of this index see Gerring et al. (2005) .
in terms of corruption. Using our simple baseline regression, we have obtained the same qualitative results as Gerring et al. (2005) , although it should be noted that they use the ICRG index of corruption instead. For the same index of corruption we find an insignificant effect from the unitary history variable (it is significant if we use the CPI index of corruption)
17 .
In other models in Tables 4 and 5 , we explore the relationship between political dimensions of decentralisation and corruption. Several forms of political decentralisation have been recognized in the literature including electoral decentralisation, structure of the party system, decision-making authority and residual powers [Treisman (2002b,a) ; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) ]. We focus, however, on a subset of these aspects for which we can find reliable data, namely indicators of electoral and authority decentralisation (also known as decision-making decentralisation).
It can be seen from Table 4 that none of the indicators of political decentralisation are significantly and consistently correlated to perceived corruption. Table 5 in Appendix suggests that this results is not robust for all measures of corruption however. According to the regression, the variable author the greater the authority over spending, taxing and legislation that is granted to sub-national governments, the more likely corrupt behaviour will arise when we measure corruption using Finally in Table 4 we direct our attention to the spatial decentralisation indicators.
The existence of autonomous contiguous regions, the number of regional jurisdictions and the number of local jurisdictions are included here along with the number 17 Some investigation suggests that this difference is due to the use of panel data in their study. 18 The severe limitations of the data, in its majority dummies or categorical variables suggest a careful interpretation of these findings. In any case, the available indicators do not seem to be affecting or affected by corruption in a direct way. of elected sub-national tiers (vertical decentralisation according to Treisman). In no case is there any evidence of a relationship of any kind with corruption. This is consistent with Treisman (2002a) who found that the number of sub-national elected tiers is sensitive to the inclusion of a measure of GDP, one of the most robust determinants of corruption, and country size. The existence of autonomous contiguous regions may be in principle associated to lower corruption given that these regions may be seen as checks on the central authority. But the fact that most of these regions are associated to ethnic groups would probably act as a balancing act increasing corruption derived from ethnic or linguistic fragmentation.
The data suggest that auton and corruption are not directly related. 
Multi-dimensional corruption
One of our objectives in this work is to try to analyse a number of dimensions of decentralisation and their relationship with corruption. As we noticed earlier, the literature in this area is somewhat vague in describing the way in which different aspects of decentralisation may be simultaneously important. In Table 6 we concentrate on the main variables found to be significant in Table 4 . Model 1
replicates the very basic model included in Table 4 is caused by the inclusion of muni for which we have many missing observations.
We have also tested (although they are not shown in the table) the other indicators for constitutional (federal ), political (state, stconst) and spatial (tiers, regj ) decentralisation in the regressions as alternative indicators of unitaryhis, muni and locj. In no case are the coefficients significantly different from zero.
As a final check on these models, we have included additional controls in the specification. The idea behind this is to account for the possibility that there are direct and independent significant effects on corruption of variables not related to decentralisation. In general, when papers examine the relationship between federalism and corruption, they either exclude any other aspect of market decentralisation from the specification [Treisman (2000)] or they fail to find any significant direct effect of federalism on corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002) ]. Models 9 through 12 experiment using the specification given by model 7 (market, political and constitutional decentralisation altogether) and adding other standard controls that have been suggested as robust determinants of corruption elsewhere [Treisman (2000) , La Porta et al. (1999) and Serra (2006) ]. The extent of political rights, the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, and dummies for British colonial history and protestantism as dominant religion come out insignificant without introducing any significant changes to the coefficients of our main variables of interest 19 . Note: All regressions exclude Argentina and Russian Federation. Robust standard errors (only t-ratios are reported). * Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level. All models are estimated by OLS. For details on data sources and description see appendix ??.
Interaction effects
Before we move on to consider the models with indirect and interaction effects we think it may be useful to examine the relationship between corruption and a few of the decentralisation indicators at different degrees of decentralisation. First, we split the sample according to certain criterion and perform a rolling regression. This procedure takes several steps involving ranking the observations on the variable of interest (market, political constitutional or spatial decentralisation in our case) and then running an initial regression for the observations satisfying the chosen criterion. For example, we may choose as our initial sub-sample the observations for which market decentralisation is less than the mean value. Another alternative is to choose an arbitrary sub-sample size and define that as the initial sub-sample. We then run a regression using this sub-sample, obtain the estimates and statistics and record the values. Next we add the nearest highest-ranked observation not included in the initial sub-sample and we drop the lowest-ranked observation included in the initial sub-sample. We always keep the sub-sample size constant throughout this analysis, thus making sure any changes are not due to the increase/decrease in sample size. We continue this procedure until the last (highest-ranked) observation is added and we record the estimates.
The only limitation to this procedure is that we can only perform it for the continuous measures of decentralisation, since using a discrete or categorical measure will result in all countries having the same rank within each category. Therefore we perform this analysis for three continuous measures of decentralisation:
exp, rev, and unitaryhis. In the exp and rev cases we are left with 68 and 67 observations respectively and we choose a sub-sample size of 30 for each 20 . We use the World Bank Control of Corruption index which has been chosen as our main corruption index. We summarize the results of the analysis in the following graphs 21 . Graph 2 shows the sensitivity of the coefficient on market decentralisation as measured through sub-national expenditure (exp) to gradual shifts from lower to higher market decentralisation. It is clear from the graph that when our sub-sample includes the lower end of the scale (fiscally centralised countries) the coefficient of market decentralisation on corruption is negative (the dots in the figure) although almost never significant at the 10% level. But as we gradually include more fiscally decentralised countries in our sub-sample, the coefficients become positive and significant for a high percentage of regressions. The fact that the graph depicts a smooth transition from negative to positive coefficients when market decentralisation increases is indicative of the presence of heterogeneity in the relationship between these two variables 22 .
Figure 2: Rolling regression for exp and wbc
A similar pattern is observed in graph 3. The decentralisation measure is now the sub-national revenue share as a proportion of total government revenue (rev).
The heterogeneity in the relationship between corruption and market decentralisation is present regardless of the market decentralisation indicator that we use.
Graph 4 show the sensitivity of the coefficients of constitutional decentralisation (unitaryhis), the degree of unitary history of a country. It is worth noting the similarities between this graph and the previous ones. This variable does not measure the same aspects though since as we noted earlier unitary countries need not be more fiscally centralised than federal countries (although in practice this seems to be the case). In any case, this graph shows preliminary evidence suggesting that the relationship between long unitary history and corruption may not be as straightforward as it has been argued [Gerring et al. (2005) ]. More importantly it appears that the relationship between long unitary history and less corruption 22 However we should note that number of sub-samples which yield a significant coefficient is rather limited. It is likely that the drop in the number of observations in each sub-sample is responsible (at least partly) for the drop in significance levels.
is being driven by the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries which have a higher GDP per capita than the rest of the countries. In fact, the average GDP per capita for the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries is almost three times that of the historically federal countries 23 .
Figure 3: Rolling regression for rev and wbc
From the previous analysis it is evident that aspects of market and constitutional decentralisation are associated with corruption. It also appears that there may be some heterogeneity in the relationship between these variables and corruption.
The results yielded by the rolling regression analysis suggest this may the case.
Furthermore, we would like to examine the form of heterogeneity existent in this relationship and in order to do this we proceed with additional econometric analysis, this time adding interaction terms to the baseline specifications.
Now we want to examine the possibility that other aspects of decentralisation may affect corruption indirectly or that market and constitutional decentralisation may have an indirect rather than a direct effect on corruption. We use a base specification including both controls for market and constitutional decentralisation and we introduce some interactions terms. In principle, we would expect that other aspects of decentralisation or of the institutional environment may affect the impact of market or constitutional decentralisation on corruption. The interactions that we propose in this section are based in theoretical presumptions provided by the relevant literature. For instance, we interact the market decentralisation control Looking at the results presented in Table 9 , one thing that we notice is that the coefficients for both market (rev ) and constitutional decentralisation (unitaryhis) keep the expected sign and their significance in most cases. As a first result, we can observe that the inclusion of interaction terms do not affect significantly the direct effects of the two decentralisation aspects.
Regarding the results for the interaction terms, only three models, 1, 5 and 7 yield significant coefficients. Model 1 produces a negative sign for interaction between constitutional decentralisation and market decentralisation. The negative sign implies that the positive effect of a unitary system on corruption is worsened when the country becomes more fiscally decentralised. As discussed earlier, unitary 
Conclusions
The last 30 years have seen a large number of countries embark in some form of decentralisation. While the causes of this trend are in general precise and well-known, its consequences are much less certain and by no means definitive.
Evaluating the results of decentralisation is not an easy task. Case studies provide an important source of evidence but generalisation is not straightforward. Crosscountry and panel-data studies are becoming more common but suffer from two main problems. On one hand, there are data issues. On the other hand, there are modelling problems. These two elements act as limiting forces on both the quantity and quality of empirical research. Nevertheless, there seems to be a renewed scholarly commitment to take the empirics to new levels.
We need better and more thorough empirical studies. We argue that a first step towards this is to understand decentralisation as multidimensional phenomenon that has a large variety of effects. In this sense, we should ideally aim at identifying these dimensions and postulating the likely effects and the interrelationships between them. In this sense, the theoretical literature has provided with interesting insights that have been often left unexplored by the empirical literature until very recently. Our work in this paper has shown why this approach is important, what are the some of questions still unresolved in the empirical literature and how to attempt a sensible approach to tackling these issues.
Recent literature has acknowledged the presence of a number of aspects that make the study of the relationship between decentralisation and corruption less obvious.
First, it has been recognized that different dimensions of decentralisation exist and that they have complex interrelations. Second, it has been argued that the extent and effects of decentralisation may depend on the existence and extent of other dimensions of decentralisation. Although these ideas are not new, they are becoming increasingly common in the empirical literature. Finally, it has also been suggested that different dimensions of decentralisation may co-evolve and their interactions over time might have a strong effect on corruption and the institutional quality.
Our results in this paper may provide a few insights regarding the policy debate on the effects of decentralisation. In particular, as we have seen, the positive effect of market decentralisation on corruption seems to be larger when countries have a deeply rooted unitarist history. While this result seems to be not so intuitive, it is plausible that deepening fiscal decentralisation without changing the constitutional basis or government organisation may indeed be associated to higher corruption. After all, delegating more money to local governments which may lack the autonomy to create taxes -as might the case in a strong unitary system-, may encourage bad governance and corruption. Furthermore, a growing number of unitary countries are resorting to local democratization processes via local elections or referenda voting. Our results suggest that a move to higher political decentralisation may have associated higher corruption particularly if the country is has a unitarist tradition and low levels of market decentralisation. It should be noted, that according to our results, the existence of long-standing unitary system has both direct and indirect association with corruption. As these have opposite signs, the overall result is uncertain and essentially an empirical matter.
Finally, although we have shown that our results are consistent with a sensible specification, and robust to controlling for different variables and data, we are rather shy regarding the direction of the causation. The aim in this paper has been to analyse the effect that the several interrelationships between multiple dimensions of decentralisation have on corruption. There may be additional considerations if endogeneity of the regressors is a possibility. In conclusion, the issue of whether decentralisation leads to more or less corruption is still uncertain and much more empirical research is needed. But we believe that this future empirical research should be aimed at exploring the interrelations of different aspects or dimensions of decentralisation. The study of these aspects has been suggested and carried out by Barenstein and de Mello (2001) , Rodden (2002) White-corrected standard errors. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. The constant term is not reported in this Continued on next page Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
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